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Analysis of managerial efﬁciency in sport economics typicaly focuses on evaluating coach 
decisions instead of assessing the organization as a whole. This paper studies the relative im-
portance of variables related to power and managerial decisions by estimating stochastic 
production frontiers models for the Chilean and Italian footbal leagues. We ﬁnd that his-
torical and geographical variables intended to capture market size play their expected roles 
in both Italy and Chile. However, the degree of technical inefﬁciency is lower magnitude in 
Chile. This diference could be due to a smaler market size and/or to ﬁnancial constraints 
faced by smal clubs in this country. 
1. INTRODUCTION
The empirical analysis of the factors, which determine
technical inefﬁciencies in the sports industry has been
a topic of intense research; see, for example, Hoﬂer
and Payne (2006), Kahane (2005) and Simmons and
Frick (2008). Technical efﬁciency is deﬁned as the
efectiveness with which a given endowment of input
factors is used to produce an output. Therefore, aﬁrm
can be considered to be technicaly efﬁcient if it gener-
ates the maximum output from a given quantity of
inputs. In the existing studies, the focus is typicaly
either on the ability of one layer of management
(the coach) to extract the best possible performance
from the players given his budget (Kahane, 2005 and
Simmons and Frick, 2008) or on the role of team strat-
egy (Hoﬂer and Payne, 2006). These studies tend not
to be focus on the overal ability of the organization
to transform its potential power over resources to the
best possible outcome.
Estimating the overal efﬁciency of diferent orga-
nizations in dealing with their resources is important
in theﬁelds of industrial organization and manage-
ment studies. However, it is usualy not an easy task,
mainly because of the difﬁculties in obtaining good
proxies for some unobservable variables, such as the
‘power’or‘performance’of the diferentﬁrms in a
given industry. However, in the analysis of sport,
these problems may be overcome. Results on theﬁeld
provide a good measure of output that are public infor-
mation, and, even where information on inputs is not
publicaly observed, observable club characteristics
may be sufﬁciently wel-corelated with clubs’com-
mand over resources to serve the purpose of testing
for efﬁciency. For example, Buraimoet al. (2007)
report high corelation, for the 92 clubs in English
professional footbal, between the potential of a club
(as represented by variables capturing its geography
and history) and both the club’s revenue and its
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ranking in the league. This is consistent with the
central proposition of the most inﬂuential theoretical
model in sports economics, the two-team league
model of El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971), which suggests
that large market clubs wil dominate smal market
clubs because they generate greater revenue and hire
beter players. For example, a club may be located in
a large city and have won many trophies in the past.
This‘big’club would therefore have a larger fan and
revenue base than its rivals and greater power in the
player labor market. If both clubs are managed efﬁ-
ciently, the‘big’club is expected to win more matches
than the smal club.
This paper presents an empirical analysis of the
presence ofx-inefﬁciency in the top divisions of the
Chilean and Italian footbal leagues through the esti-
mation of stochastic production frontiers. The compar-
ison between levels and efﬁciency in the two leagues
is especialy interesting given that, compared with
the Italian league, clubs in the Chilean league face a
lower demand and is in principle more likely to be
afected byﬁnancial restrictions at the national level
that prevent them from achieving the highest possible
performance.1Moreover, the comparative analysis of
these two extreme cases is a novel aspect of our paper
compared with related literature on sport, which usu-
aly focuses on a single national league. The selection
of the Chilean league is motivated by the fact that the
structure of the Chilean competition has been rela-
tively stable and al the required information was pub-
licly available during the period of analysis. This is not
the case of other modest national leagues in Latin
America, such as the Peruvian or the Mexican compe-
titions. The selection of the Italian league is because it
is one of the top competitions of the world in terms of
media atention and trophies both at the national and
club levels.
The main hypothesis to be tested is whether, unlike
to the Italian league, performance in the Chilean
league is mainly determined by a smaler market size
and/or toﬁnancial constraints, and, as a result of this,
managerial decisions play a less signiﬁcant role in
the Chilean league. In particular, our econometric
speciﬁcation relates team performance to a set of
power indicators (history and past results), whereas
stochastic deviations of this function can be explained
by managerial decision variables. Then, this estima-
tion is used for a comparative discussion of team efﬁ-
ciency between, instead of within, leagues. Although
it is very difﬁcult, if not impossible, to classify each
of the footbal clubs in the sample according to their
size and complexity, it can be generaly accepted that
teams in the Chilean league are smaler and simpler
enterprises than teams in the Italian league.2
To preview, weﬁnd evidence of technical inefﬁ-
ciencies in both the Chilean and the Italian leagues.
However, an important diference is that, in the Italian
league, a signiﬁcant share of team performance is due
to stochastic shocks related to the efﬁciency of club
management; by contrast, stochastic elements do not
play a signiﬁcant role in the Chilean league. This dif-
ference could be explained by the presence of simpler
and smaler clubs in the Chilean league that could be
because of the diferent size of the market and/or toﬁ-
nancial constraints faced by smal clubs in that country.
In the next section of the paper, we provide some
theoretical insights about the relationship between insti-
tutional complexity and managerial efort. Section 3
presents and describes the variables used in the analysis,
and Section 4 explains the econometric approach used
to estimate the impact of resource variables and techni-
cal inefﬁciencies on output in Chilean and Italian
footbal and discusses the results of the estimation.
Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2. GUIDANCE FROM THEORY
In this section, we develop intuition about the relation-
ship between managerial efort and institutional com-
plexity. In order to do this, we adopt the framework
of Paolini and Tena (2012) that is itself an extended
version of other two clubs models in theﬁeld of sport
economics, El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971), Haanet al.
(2002) and Késenne (2007).
In this framework, there are two clubs (i= 1, 2),
which play a series of matches against each other. Each
of the clubs has simultaneously to decide its level of
capital (ki) and managerial efort (si) in order to maxi-
mize its proﬁt functionVi(ki,si)=Πi(ki,si) Ci(ki,si).
These two variables have a positive impact on revenue
(Πi) as capital and efort increase the probability of
winning but, on the other hand, it is increasingly more
costly (Ci) for a club to augment its level of capital and
managerial efort. The later efect is more important
because while the revenue of the clubs is bounded and
subject to decreasing returns, the cost can be increased
to inﬁnity. This is a usual and realistic assumption in
theoretical models and ensures that an equilibrium level
for both variables exists; see Mas-Colelet al. (1995),
Chapter 5.
The key assumption of the model states that
∂Ciki;sið Þ
∂kjðÞ>0, withi≠j
3
: the cost (of capital) by a certain
club is positively afected by the quantity invested by
its rival. The reason for this is that if a club invests
heavily in atracting most of the star players, footbal
fans and media atention, it wil leave less of the mar-
ket to its rival.
Under these conditions, the equilibrium of the
model states the folowing: (1) there is an optimal
level of managerial efort (s*i) given capital invest-
ment for each club; and (2) the equilibrium levels of
capital and managerial efort of each clubs are
inversely related:∂si∂ki<0.In this framework, it becomes interesting to analyze
how managerial efort in each club reacts to changes
in capital. For example, let us assume that one of the
clubs (e.g.,j) suddenly increases its capital (k*j). This
wil make capital more expensive for the rival club,
and hence it wil react by reducing its level of capital,
∂ki∂kj<0, and increasing its managerial efort,∂si∂kj>0,
due to the negative relationship between these two
variables. A relevant implication of this is that clubs
with low capital, either because of a reduced share of
the market or due to restrictions in theﬁnancial mar-
ket, wil react by increasing its level of managerial
efort.3
According to this hypothesis, it is relevant to ana-
lyze the importance of managerial variables in two
extreme cases, one in which the level of capital by
diferent clubs is clearly constrained by the size of
the market (the Chilean league) and another with big
and complex clubs (the Italian league). The prediction
of the model is the clubs’performance in the Chilean
league is mainly determined by resources alocation
that is potentialy constrained by the size of the market
byﬁnancial restrictions. Therefore, managers play a
less important role in this league than in the Italian
competition where clubs face less severe restrictions,
and it is not the availability of inputs, but the way they
are combined to produce a certain level of output what
makes the diference.
Of course, as discussed in the introduction, this
analysis requires taking consideration of the total
endowment of the clubs. In our particular framework,
this is a much more broadly measure than the budget
on players that is very likely to be endogenously
afected by performance expectations. Moreover, it does
not include al the available information about capital of
the club. Especialy in professional footbal, this
measure of capital is largely intangible as it includes
branding. However, it is reasonable to assume that this
intangible capital is highly corelated with a set of proxy
variables that should include stadium capacity and the
history of the club (see Buraimoet al. (2007). In
addition, we also include in the group of endowment
variables the size of the city as it could be considered
as an indicator of the potential number of supporters
of the club. For example, in the case of Italy, the
Istituto Nielsen reports the number of supporters
(‘tifosi’) for each Italian club in Series A during 2008.
The clubs with the most supporters were Juventus, F.C.
Internazionale di Milano, A.C. Milan and Roma. These
clubs belong to the three biggest cities in Italy, Turin,
Milan and Rome. The clubs with fewest supporters
corespond to smal cities such as Verona, Lecce and
Siena. We do not have such detailed information
about the number of supporters for clubs in the
Chilean league, but it can be clearly observed that
clubs from Santiago, the biggest city in the country,
typicaly win the Chilean national league.
In the remaining of this paper, we estimate and
analyze a stochastic production function for the top
league competitions in Chile and Italy. Consistent
with the framework just discussed in this section, the
variables considered in the estimation of the stochastic
production function are the set of inputs related to the
resources of clubs that cannot be modiﬁed in the short
run and technical decision variables, which refer to the
composition of the squad and manager features. This
is a novel aspect compared with the related literature
in sport economics (discussed in the introduction),
which typicaly focuses on the evaluation of the efﬁ-
ciency of coaches and/or club players given the wage
budget of the club. Unlike this literature, our interest
is in the evaluation of managerial efﬁciency, control-
ling for the amount of resources of the whole organi-
zation. The nul hypothesis is that input variables
should mater more (and therefore, explain a higher
proportion of outcome, i.e., results) in the Chilean
league because the capital of clubs in this competition
is restricted by the size of the market, and possibly
they are more likely to faceﬁnancial constraints. Also,
technical decision variables should explain a higher
proportion of results in Italy.
3. DATA ON THE ITALIAN AND CHILEAN
FOOTBALL LEAGUE
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For the Italian league, our season-level variables relate
to the period from 1992/1993 to 2007/2008. During
the sample period, there were 18 teams before 2004/
2005 and 20 teams from 2004/2005 in the Italian
Series A. Before season 2004/2005, four teams were
promoted and relegated and three teams afterwards.
The best four teams qualify for the Champions League,
whereas teams can qualify for the Europa League
either by winning the Italian Cup or by ending up in
theﬁfth or sixth position in the national league.
In the case of Chile, our database covers the period
from 1993 to 2008. Theﬁrst division was composed
of 16 teams until 2004 and since then 20, 19, 21 and
20 for seasons 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008, respectively.
Each season is composed of two sequential competi-
tions as folows: Opening (‘Apertura’) and Closing
(‘Clausura’). The champion of each tournament and
the best second ranked automaticaly qualiﬁed for the
most important international competition at the club
level in South America, Copa Libertadores de America.
The folowing variables are considered in both cases:
Output (performance) measure
(i) Number of points divided by the maximum
available for theith team in seasont(yi,t).
Although during the sample period the number
of points awarded for a victory changed from
two to three, in season 1995/1996 for the Italian
league and 1996 for the Chilean league, to make
the performance measure consistent across
seasons, we computed it on the basis of three
points for a win throughout the whole period.
A dummy variable is used in the estimation to
represent the seasons when three points was
actualy employed as the change in incentives
was likely to have inﬂuenced the patern of
results. Simmons and Frick (2008) folowed a
similar procedure for Germany.
Resource variables
(i) International tournament (x1,i,t): dummy that takes
the value 1 when clubiwas playing in that
season’s European Champion League (Italy) or
Copa de Libertadores (Chile) at seasont.
(ii) Stadium capacity (x2,i,t).
(iv) Population size of the city (where the team
plays its home games) (x3,i,t).
(v) Champion in previous years (x4,i,t): a weighted
sum of the number of national league trophies
in the previous 3 years. The weights were (1/t2)
wheretwas 1 for the previous season, 2 for the
season before and 3 for the season before that.
(vi) Performance in previous years (x5,i,t): a weighted
measure of the inverse of the ranking of each
team in each of the top division competitions in
the preceding 3 years. Performance is equal to
0 in case a team has been in the second division.
Weights are deﬁned similarly to the previous
variable.
Of course, the choice of the three previous years in
the last two variables is to an extend arbitrary. How-
ever, this is not a relevant decision because there is a
strong inertial component in clubs’performance and
recent results are more informative about the curent
club’s position than distant result. In fact, some
experiments not explicitly reported here, but available
from the authors under request, show that our results
are robust to the consideration ofﬁve (instead of three)
previous years as a measure of performance.
(vi) Capital city (x6,i,t): a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 when the team plays in the capital of
the country, Santiago de Chile in the case of
Chile and Rome in the case of Italy.
Technical decisions variables
(vii) Total number of players (z1,t,t): total number of
footbalers in each squad.
(ix) Number of foreigners (z2,i,t): total number of
foreigners for each club.
(x) % goalkeepers (z3,i,t): share of goalkeepers in
the squad.
(xi) % defenders (z4,i,t): share of defenders in the
squad.
(xi) % midﬁelders (z5,i,t): share of midﬁelders in the
squad.
(xii) Number of high scoring players (z6,i,t): number
of players at each club who had scored more
than 20 goals in the previous season. Of course,
this variable could be afected by many events
that were notﬁxed through time such as injuries,
the presence of international competitions at the
club or national level and the number of teams in
the league. However, it is difﬁcult to take al
these events into account based on subjective
appreciation, and because of this, we do not
change the deﬁnition of this variable through
the sample. We acknowledge this as a potential
weakness of our analysis, to be explored in future
research.
(xiv) Manager quality (z7,i,t): proportion of matches
won during the career of the manager of the
club prior to seasontin his respective league
(Chile or Italy).
(xv) Manager experience (z8,i,t
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): number of years that
the coach of the team had been involved in
managerial activities in his respective league
(Chile or Italy).
(xvi) Foreign manager (z9i,t): a dummy variable that
takes the value 1 when the manager is a for-
eigner and 0 otherwise.
Al these variables were colected for the beginning
of the season to avoid potential endogeneity problems.
Table 1 displays some descriptive statistics of these
variables. The average values for many of the vari-
ables are very similar in Italy and Chile. The most
relevant diferences between the two leagues can be
observed in stadium capacity, which on average takes
higher values in Italian footbal. Also, size of the city
reveals that top division teams are more concentrated
in the big cities for the Chilean footbal league (mainly
in the capital Santiago de Chile), whereas in Italy there
are top footbal teams in relatively smal cities. This is
the case, for example, in Atalanta, Livorno, Empoli,
Siena and Udinense. Some important diferences also
relate to the number of foreign players and managers
in the two countries. As expected, the Italian league at-
tracts a higher number of foreigners.
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The model of stochastic frontier production functions
was initialy developed by Aigneret al. (1977) and
Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) and extended
to panel data by Batese and Coeli (1995). The stan-
dard speciﬁcation for a set ofﬁrms indexed byiover
a number of periodstcan be represented as
Yi;t¼αþβ′xi;tþ νi;tþυi;t i¼1;…;N;t¼1;…;T
(1)
whereYi,tis a measure ofﬁrmi’s output at timet,xi,tis
a vector of the inputs deﬁned in the previous section,
andβis a vector of unknown coefﬁcients to be esti-
mated. A common practice in the literature is to take
logs of variablesYi,tandxi,t. However, here, we do
not apply this transformation of the dependent variable
as it is already deﬁned as a ratio (points divided by
maximum possible points in a season)4.
The remainder of the equation is an eror term com-
posed of two components: (1)νi,tis a random eror
term assumed to beideN0;σ2ν; and (2)υi,tis a non-negative random eror term that is assumed to be inde-
pendent and to folow a normal distribution that is
truncated at 0 andideNmi;t;σ2υ. Mean inefﬁciency,mi,t, is modeled as a function of variousﬁrm-level fac-
tors. Speciﬁcaly,
mi;t¼δ′zi;tþwi;t (2)
wherezi,tis a vector of technical decisions undertaken
byﬁrmiin periodt, andδis another vector of
coefﬁcients to be estimated. The eror term is assumed
to beideN0;σ2w truncated at δ’zi,tfor consis-tency with the assumption thatυi,tis nonnegative and
truncated at 0.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Italy Chile
Average Variance Minimum Maximum Average Variance Minimum Maximum
Points divided by maximuma 0.472 0.020 0 0.851 0.471 0.017 0.144 0.833
Capital 0.138 0.119 0 1 0.395 0.240 0 1
International tournament 0.194 0.157 0 1 0.172 0.143 0 1
Stadium capacity (scale 1/100,000) 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.008 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.053
Size of the city (scale 1/1000.000) 0.091 0.007 0.007 0.271 0.190 0.044 0.001 0.467
Champion in previous years 0.130 0.119 0 1.833 0.143 0.110 0 1.583
Performance in previous years 0.909 0.094 0.121 1.539 0.928 0.080 0.333 1.521
Number of foreigners 8.039 20.756 0 24 3.953 1.804 0 7
Total number of players 25.836 11.575 17 36 26.219 18.836 18 43
% goalkeepers 0.087 0.001 0.036 0.167 0.090 0.001 0.036 0.174
% defenders 0.326 0.002 0.174 0.448 0.306 0.003 0.136 0.48
% midﬁelders 0.370 0.003 0.227 0.538 0.376 0.004 0.214 0.545
% forwards 0.217 0.003 0.095 0.44 0.228 0.002 0.12 0.423
Number of high scoring players 1.190 0.639 0 4 0.974 1.301 0 7
Manager quality 0.374 0.021 0 0.697 0.310 0.032 0 0.705
Manager experience 2.224 2.772 1 13 3.957 14.653 0 17
Foreign manager 0.138 0.119 0 1 0.330 0.222 0 1
New manager 0.409 0.243 0 1 0.451 0.249 0 1
aFor the Italian League, there is an unique case of a team with 0 points that corespond to Juventus in season 2005/2006 that was demoted to
Serie B because of a matchﬁ
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xing scandal.
The model presented in Equations (1) and (2) is esti-
mated folowing the maximum likelihood method pro-
posedbyBateseandCoeli(1993)andmadeavailable
in Coeli’s (1996) computer programFRONTIER4.1.
The parameterγ¼ σ2υ=σ2νþσ2υ .takes values in
[0, 1], and it is particularly important as it shows the
proportion of the sum of the two eror variances that
is accounted by technical inefﬁciencies. When this
parameter is not statisticaly diferent from 0, then it
is not possible to reject the nul hypothesis of zero tech-
nical inefﬁciencies and the speciﬁcation to estimate the
production function should be a standard panel data
econometric procedure.
As discussed in Section 1, because our focus is not
speciﬁcaly on the coach but on the efﬁciency of the
organization as a whole, the production frontier is
not estimated by relating performance to the quality
of the playing staf at the club as proxied by its total
wage bil. Another important reason for not including
the wage bil in this study is that the size of the budget
at each club was not available at al in the case of
Chile; even for Italy, theﬁgures for wage bils were
probably unreliable either because clubs had an in-
centive to misreport or simply because complex bonus
arangements make it hard to represent a club’sﬁnan-
cial commitment with a single summaryﬁgure.5Note
also that, given their focus on coaching ability, the
wage bil is properly taken as exogenous in the
empirical models of Kahane (2005) and Simmons
and Frick (2008) but its size wil in fact be inﬂuenced
by expected team performance that year.
Accordingly, our resource variables, the xi,tin
Equation (1), seek to represent factors from the geog-
raphy and history of the club that should, colectively,
determine its power to command resources. The task
of management in the organization is to translate
power into output (points). Decisions are, of course,
taken at a number of levels in the club. In the stylized
club we have in mind, the owners (perhaps repre-
sented by the chairman) or other senior managers hire
a coach. The coach is then co-opted into management
and may wel have some input in the recruitment of
the playing staf with whatever budget has been made
available (in some cases, a director of footbal wil
play the primary role here). Erors of judgment may
be made, for example, by the chairman (who may
choose a lower quality coach to work with the more
expensive players whom the club can then aford) or
by the director of footbal (who may use his budget
to hire a suboptimal balance of stars and journeymen
or international and local players). Poor decisions at
any level of management wil prevent the club from
reaching the level of performance (in terms of league
points) that should be possible given its power and sta-
tus. In our speciﬁcation of Equation (2) previously, the
zi,t(the technical decision variables) represent a selec-
tion of such technical decisions. Studying them would
not yield any conclusions if the management team at
every club operated with maximum efﬁciency because
then each club would be achieving the level of sport-
ing performance commensurate with its endowment
of power.
Table 2 presents generalized likelihood-ratio tests
of the nul hypothesis that the inefﬁciency efects are
absent from the model and that decision variables are
jointly insigniﬁcant. A general result for al the speci-
ﬁcations is that inefﬁciency efects are highly signiﬁ-
cant in both the Italian and the Chilean leagues.
Table 3 reports results from the estimation of the
stochastic frontiers for the two leagues (for Italy,
columns (2) to (4) relate to re-estimation in robustness
tests reported later; the lead results are in column (1).
The coreﬁnding is from the estimation ofγthat sug-
gests a more important role of stochastic shocks in
managerial decisions in the Italian compared with the
Chilean league.
Table 2. Tests of Hypotheses for Parameters of the Inefﬁciency Frontier in the Italian and Chilean Leagues
Italy Chile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (5)
Nul hypothesis:H0:γ=δ0=…=δ11=0Test statistic 181.99*** 215.49*** 183.52*** 183.70*** 133.04*** 39.33*** 32.21***
Nul hypothesis:H0:δ0=…=δ11=0Test statistic 157.72*** 205.38*** 161.08*** 159.3*** 115.7*** 39.32*** 32.32***
(1) Estimation including al teams in the top division. (2) Estimation excluding observations from seasons 2004/2005, 2005/2006 and 2006/
2007. (3) Estimation similar to (1) but variable‘capital’refers to the capital of any Italian province. (4) Estimation similar to (1) but variable
‘capital’refers to any of the four biggest Italian cities. (5) Estimation similar to (1) but including the variable“new manager”in the estima
tion and dropping teams that was in the second division the previous year. ***, **and *denote rejection at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 signiﬁ
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Among the resource variables, the results for Italy
show that the size of a team’s home city is indeed an
important determinant of the level of achievement of
a footbal club. However, the beneﬁt from city size is
mitigated by location in the capital city; this could
reﬂect diminishing returns to city size in the sports sec-
tor (Buraimoet al., 2009), or the fact that, in the Italian
context, the biggest cities usualy host competing high
level footbal clubs that split the market. Stadium
capacity (for a given size of city) is shown to have a
negative impact on performance. Possibly managers
with a large number of seats toﬁl relative to the size
of the local market wil have to price tickets lower:
with the inelastic demand claimed to prevail in sports
markets in developed countries, this wil imply
depressed revenue compared with what would be
expected given the size of the city. Results on these
spatial variables are diferent in Chile. There popula-
tion itself is not signiﬁcant but location in Santiago
de Chile assuredly is. This combination of results
likely reﬂects that a high proportion of clubs is located
in the capital, and, given they al have the same value
for city size, this wil prevent the importance of
population size per se from being detected in the
estimation. In general, some Chilean clubs may face
strongerﬁnancial constraints and/or a lower demand
by supporters and media to increase the capacity of
the stadium, and therefore, it is not surprising that sta-
dium size is a positive predictor of performance in this
case. While results on these spatial variables display
contrasts between Italy and Chile, the history variables
yield similarﬁndings: a history of achievement raises
performance in the curent period. Again, this is
consistent with the importance of market size as clubs
that were successful in the past wil have colected
more supporters on the way to the present.
Our technical decision variables test for efects
from several individual categories of technical mana-
gerial decisions. The choice of coach is shown to mat-
ter substantialy. For Italy, similar to Simmons and
Frick (2008) for Germany, weﬁnd that the quality of
the coach (as reﬂected in his career win-ratio) is im-
portant; but his length of experience has no indepen-
dent role. Because it is inefﬁciency that is being
modeled, the negative sign indicates that clubs who
employ a coach with a beter than average career
record tend to be the clubs that are more efﬁcient in
converting status to sporting performance. The same
is found in Chile. One of several possible explanations
is that decision takers at some clubs undervalue
coaching relative to player inputs. Note that we do
not include a variable to account for the inﬂuence of
a new manager (compared with the one whoﬁnished
the previous season). The reason is that, for the
Chilean league, we do not have information about
the manager of teams playing in the second division
the previous year, and here, we show a similar estima-
tion in both countries for the purpose of comparison.
However, when we run a similar estimation for Italy,
including this variable, there are no signiﬁcant changes
in our results; the proportion of eror variance due to
technical inefﬁciencies is stil signiﬁcant (0.928 with
at-value of 12.22), and the variable new manager
exerts a negative impact (but not signiﬁcantly diferent
from 0) on performance. This result accords with
previous analysis by Tena and Forest (2007), by using
match level data, who suggest that a new manager has
only a very smal efect, and then only for a smal
number of matches (scapegoat hypothesis).
Players’wages account for the largest part of ex-
penditure by professional sports teams, and it is clearly
a key that whatever budget is available is spent judi-
ciously. One trade-of clubs face is between the
number of players on the roster and the average
quality of players (higher quality players are likely to
bemore expensive), andastriking feature from Table 3
is the very high variance in squad size. In both coun-
tries, clubs with a below average squad size appear
to be more efﬁcient than those who opt for more
players. Perhaps the former enjoy greater success be-
cause of substitution of quality for quantity, or it could
be that players in a smal squad beneﬁt from having
more playing time. Of course, it is also (just) possible
that clubs who employ a higher number of personnel
understand that this lowers expected performance but
accept the fact because they are risk averse and, for
example, want to guard against the adverse conse-
quences of an exceptional number of injuries. The
same remark qualiﬁes theﬁnding that a higher number
of goalkeepers in the squad appears to be associated
(in Italy) with lower efﬁciency. But the ratios of
defenders and midﬁelders are not signiﬁcant expla-
natory variables in either country. Therefore, the results
do not point a way to increasing the efﬁciency of clubs
by altering these proportions.
As an additional robustness test, we analyze the im-
pact of including a new decision variable in the model,
new coach that is deﬁ
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ned as a dummy variable, which
takes value 1 when the manager of the team at the be-
ginning of the season is diferent from the one at the
end of the previous season. In this case, we are obliged
to drop observations from teams playing in the second
division in the previous year as information about this
variable was not available for teams in the Chilean
Table 4. Stochastic Production Frontier Estimation for Diferent Measures of City Size
Italy Chile
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Intercept β0 0.76 0.78 0.38 0.39(17.32) (9.28) (12.87) (21.49)
*** *** *** ***
Three points dummy β1 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04(2.83) (3.24) (2.24) (1.89)
*** *** *** *
Capital β2 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.06(1.09) ( 1.65) (3.56) (3.91)
* *** ***
International tournament β3 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04(0.71) (0.53) (1.84) (2.11)
* **
Stadium capacity β4 4.12 2.90 5.96 5.00(1.37) ( 1.07) (3.95) (3.36)
*** ***
Size of city β5 0.000001 0.00002 0.00001 0.0003(0.71) (2.77) (2.54) (1.54)
*** ***
Champion in previous years β6 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04( 0.49) ( 0.83) (1.37) (1.61)
Performance inprevious years β7 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.07(1.63) (1.76) (2.88) (3.52)
* *** ***
Intercept δ1 0.29 0.28 0.20 0.14(4.60) (6.70) ( 1.32) ( 0.97)
*** ***
Number of foreign players δ2 0.004 0.004 0.02 0.02( 2.59) ( 2.57) ( 2.79) ( 2.87)
*** *** *** ***
Total number of players δ3 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01(5.22) (5.38) (5.43) (6.13)
*** *** *** ***
% goalkeepers δ4 0.45 0.44 0.35 0.46(2.17) (2.26) ( 1.06) ( 1.17)
*** *** *
% defenders δ5 0.03 0.02 0.27 0.14(0.21) (0.18) (1.23) (0.63)
% midﬁelders δ6 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.05(0.39) (0.31) ( 0.11) ( 0.30)
Number of high scoring players δ7 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04( 2.94) ( 3.04) ( 4.17) ( 3.19)
*** *** *** ***
Manager quality δ8 0.45 0.44 0.18 0.19( 8.98) ( 8.93) ( 3.43) ( 2.67)
*** *** *** ***
Manager experience δ9 0.0005 0.0006 0.01 0.01( 0.18) ( 0.19) (2.99) (3.29)
*** ***
Foreign manager δ10 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01(0.86) (1.00) ( 0.97) ( 0.63)
Composed eror variance σ2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(12.46) (12.75) (8.98) (9.55)
*** *** *** ***
Proportion of eror variance due to
technical inefﬁciencies
γ 1.00 1.00 0.11 0.10
(3.83) (1.86) (0.95) (1.47)
*** *
Log likelihood 337.34 340.43 272.71 271.23
Observations 296 296 274 274
Al estimation includes the baseline speciﬁcation. Estimation (1) considers per capita income of the city and estimation (2) the total income
of the city as the measure of city size.
***, **and *denote rejection at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 signiﬁ
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cance level, respectively.
league. Results of this estimation reﬂect that now the
efﬁciency hypothesis is rejected in both cases because
the Chilean league proves to be particularly inefﬁcient
in replacing old managers. However, also in this case
the proportion of variance due to technical inefﬁcien-
cies (and also the associatedt-statistics) is substantialy
larger in the Italian compared with the Chilean league.
From the results, a particularly tricky decision for
footbal clubs (as wil be the case for managers in
other creative industries, such as opera or research) is
the proportion of resources to be used on star per-
formers. In footbal, these are usualy successful
strikers, deﬁned here by the variable‘number of high
scoring players’. This atracts a negative coefﬁcient
estimate for both countries, implying that clubs that
choose to employ none or only a smal number wil
fail to reach the production frontier. The implication
that some clubs undervalue genuine strikers is weak-
ened, of course, if there are labor market imperfec-
tions, which restrict their movement away from their
curent clubs.
The degree of efﬁciency shown by a club in the
Italian League appears also to be associated with its
propensity to recruit foreign players compared with
other clubs. Just as Kahane (2005) demonstrated that
clubs, which displayed a reluctance to employ franco-
phone ice hockey players tended to pay a price in
terms of lower levels of performance, so here a club
with a below average number of foreigners is shown
to fare worse as a result.6However, no signiﬁcant
efect is found in Chile, probably because its weak
league cannot atract quality foreign footbalers who
would provide beter value than local players.
Broadly, the results of the model imply that, while
historical and geographical variables intended to cap-
ture market size play their expected roles in both Italy
and Chile, the degree of technical inefﬁciency is lower
magnitude in Chile. To test the robustness of these re-
sults, we analyze now the implications of two diferent
set of experiments. These estimations are also shown
in Table 3. More speciﬁcaly, ourﬁrst group of
experiments refers to possible distortions resulting
from penalties imposed on clubs for ilegal activities
(mainly matchﬁxing scandals) in the Italian league
during seasons 2004/2005, 2005/2006 and 2006/2007.
We eliminate these three seasons from the sample and
estimate the model again. Main results were robust to
this experiment.7
The model was also estimated for diferent deﬁnitions
of variables for the Italian case. More speciﬁcaly, we
consider a dummy variable that takes value 1 when the
team is located in any of the biggest four Italian cities:
Rome, Milan, Naples and Turin. Conclusions are not af-
fected in either case, and the nul of managerial efﬁciency
could be rejected in both instances at the 1% level.8
Another set of experiments related to the inclusion
of size of the city. As discussed earlier, this is a poten-
tialy controversial indicator as it is a proxy variable
for market size. We experimented with some alterna-
tive deﬁnitions of market size, such as the number of
inhabitants in the city divided by the number of clubs.
However this variable turned out not to be signiﬁcant,
which suggests at least in the long run, the size of the
market in a given city is not exogenously given but it
could be stimulated by the competition of rival
neighbor teams. We also studied whether some alterna-
tive variables related not only to the number of citizens
but also to income could have a signiﬁcant impact on
performance. More speciﬁcaly, we ran the baseline
estimation but replaced the number of citizens by the
folowing: (1) income per-capita in the city and (2)
total income in the city. Results of this estimation are
reported in Table 4. Note that the main conclusions of
the paper stand, and, interestingly, per-capita income
is signiﬁcant only for Chile, and total income is signiﬁ-
cant only for Italy. This suggests that the relevant mar-
ket size indicator for a footbal team could be diferent
for a developed and a developing country. Indeed it is
plausible to assume that a minimum level of income is
needed to become a footbal fan, and once this threshold
is surpassed, footbal stop being a luxury good, and
therefore, total demand mainly depends on the number
of potential supporters.
This paper analyzes the relationship between resource
inputs and managerial efﬁciency inﬁrms by the esti-
mation of stochastic production frontiers for the top
divisions in Chilean and Italian footbal. Unlike previ-
ous research, we focus not only on coach efﬁciency
but also on the ability of the whole organization to
transform its potential power over resources to the best
possible outcome in terms of league points. Results
indicate the presence of technical inefﬁciencies in both
cases, but technical inefﬁciencies play a more impor-
tant role in the Italian League in a way that is consis-
tent with the theoretical explanation provided in
Section 2 that suggests that managerial decisions pro-
vide a more important role whenﬁrms do not face
strong restrictions imposed by the size of the market
or byﬁ
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nancial variables. Although the comparison of
two extreme cases is a novel aspect of our paper, a
more complete and deﬁnitive analysis should be based
on the comparison of national leagues in a number of
diferent countries. This work is left for further research.
Other future lines of research are suggested by this
work. First, an important branch of the sports literature
is devoted to studying the factors that explain difer-
ences in competitive balance; see, for example, Butler
(1995), Floreset al.(2010) and Horowitz (1997).
Given that our results show how the impact of diferent
variables on results performance depends on indicators
of geography and history, as wel as managerial deci-
sions undertaken by the clubs, it would be interesting
to study the relative importance of these variables in
order to explain diferences in competitive balance
for sport competitions. Further, given that power indi-
cators are notﬁxed in time but could be afected by
marketﬂuctuations, as wel as by changes in regula-
tions, the model provides insight about how manage-
ment efort and the structure of the competition wil
be afected by these changes.
Finaly, it is critical to understand why the relative
importance of power depends on the structure of na-
tional competitions. Our results suggest that, in leagues
with smaler and simpler clubs, power variables ex-
plain a more important share of results than in the case
of strong leagues, whereas the opposite holds for
managerial decision variables. Developing a theo-
retical model, which provides an explanation for this
result is an issue to be explored in future research.
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NOTES
1. Note that the analysis period in this paper does not include
the curentﬁnancial economic crisis that had a more impor
tant efect on Europe than on Latin American countries.
2. Although we do not have budget information for al the
teams in the Chilean league we know, for example, that
the three highest transfer fees paid in the history of the
Chilean footbal were for Macnely Tores, USD 2 mil
lions in 2008, Nelson Cabrera, USD 1 milion in 2008
and Mauricio Victorino USD 800,000 in 2009. These re
cord Chilean transfer fees are in fact similar in magnitude
to those routinely paid every year by the smalest clubs in
the Italian Serie A.
3. The Appendix formaly sets out the speciﬁcation of the
theoretical model.
4. Note that this estimation would be consistent with the log
transformation of a Cobb Douglas functional form such
as expYi;t ¼∏Ki1 expxi;t βi* expνi;tþυi;t wherexi,t= 1, andβiis theith component of vectorβ.5. In addition, it is plausible to assume that, for the same
salary, a footbaler would prefer to play for a stronger
team. Stronger clubs therefore need to pay less for a
given quality of squad, and this would produce an addi
tional distortion in the use of salary as an indicator of
power.
6. Recent papers have highlighted the beneﬁcial efects of
foreign players in increasing the probability of success
of the national team (Alvarezet al., 2011 report this
efect for the case of basketbal and atribute it to spilover
efects that raise the ability level of domestic players, and
Binder and Findlay (2012)ﬁnd a positive efect, but only
in the short run, for European footbal) and in increasing
or not harming the level of competitiveness in domestic
leagues, Floreset al. (2010), Binder and Findlay (2012)
and Frick (2009).
7. Main results are not altered when instead of dropping the
three seasons afected by the Moggi scandal we just elim
inate the teams involved in the practice ofﬁxing matches
from the regression; see Boeri and Severgnini (2011).
8. We also tried with an ad hoc deﬁnition of‘capital’for
Italy: the city of Milan where two of the most important
footbal teams play, Internazionale di Milano and A.C.
Milan. However, this variable was not signiﬁcant at
conventional levels.
APPENDIX
The proﬁt function is
Viki;sið Þ¼Πiki;sið Þ Ciki;sið Þ:
RevenueΠi(ki,si) is composed of two parts, one cer-
tain and one uncertain. Formaly, we haveΠi(ki,si)=
Dki+Fpi. We assume thatF>D.
In particular, we denote bypithe probability of
success in the industry byﬁrm i and assume thatpi
depends positively on its own resource investment
(si) and on managerial efort (ki), and negatively on
the level of capital investment and managerial efort
undertaken by its competitor, (kj,sj). In particular, we
give to this probability the folowing functional form:
pi¼12þ
1
2 si sjþ ki kj
withpi∈[0, 1] andp1+p2=1
Regarding the cost function, it is assumed that cost
depends on the club’s own resources, (ki), and efort,
(si), as wel as on the level of resource investment
undertaken by the rivalﬁrm in the industry, (kj).
Formaly, we suppose thatCi=(ki+kj)ki+si(si+ki)
withi= 1, 2 andj≠i
13
.
In the unconstrained case, clubs 1 and 2 decide
their respective levels of investment and efort.
By equalizing the marginal returns of clubsiandj,
weﬁnd that
ki¼12D kjþ
1
4F 2si
si¼14F 2ki:
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